Deduction without dogmas: the case of moral analogical argumentation by Bermejo Luque, Lilian
© Lilian Bermejo-Luque. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No.3 (2014), pp. 311-336. 






Department of Philosophy  
University of Granada 




Abstract: In a recent paper, Fábio 
Perin Shecaira (2013) proposes a 
defence of Waller’s deductivist 
schema for moral analogical 
argumentation. This defence has 
several flaws, the most important of 
them being that many good 
analogical arguments would be 
deemed bad or deficient. 
Additionally, Shecaira misrepresents 
my alternative account as something 
in between deductivism and non-
deductivism. This paper is both an 
attempt at solving this 
misunderstanding and an analysis 
and criticism of Waller and 
Shecaira’s forms of deductivism. 
Résumé; Dans un article récent, 
Fábio Perin Shecaira (2013) défend 
l’approche déductiviste de Waller 
pour évaluer des arguments par 
analogie traitant de sujets moraux. 
Cette défense a plusieurs défauts, le 
plus important d'entre eux est que 
plusieurs bons arguments par 
analogie seraient jugés mauvais ou 
faibles. En outre, Shecaira dénature 
mon approche alternative en la 
décrivant comme quelque chose 
entre un déductivisme et un non 
déductivisme. Je tente à la fois de 
résoudre ce malentendu et d’offrir 
une analyse et une critique des 
formes de deductivisme de Waller et 
de Shecaira. 
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In a recent paper published in this journal, Perin Shecaira (2013) 
proposed a defence of Waller’s (2001) deductivist schema for 
moral analogical argumentation against Trudy Govier’s (1989 
and 2002), Marcello Guarini’s (2004) and my own (Bermejo-
Luque, 2012) proposals. As I see it, this defence has several 
flaws, the most important of them being his contention that 
many good analogical arguments should be deemed bad or 
deficient on that standard. Additionally, Shecaira misrepresents 
my proposal as something in between deductivist and non-
deductivist accounts of this type of argumentation. This paper is 
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both an attempt at solving this misunderstanding and an analysis 
and criticism of Waller and Shecaira’s form of deductivism. 
To this end, I will start by characterizing analogical 
claims as a very special type of claim in that they do not have 
semantic content of their own. This account, which is in line 
with the mainstream view in philosophy of language and 
linguistics, is meant to explain the peculiarities of the use of 
analogies in argumentation, as argued in Bermejo-Luque (2012). 
Then, I will distinguish between analogies and analogical 
arguments and, within each of these categories, between 
quantitative (or a posteriori) analogies and qualitative (or a 
priori) analogies, on the one hand, and between deductive 
analogical arguments and inductive analogical arguments 
(sections 2 and 3), on the other. Following these distinctions, I 
will argue that the expression ‘a priori analogies’, as used by 
Govier and her followers, is misleading in several ways. I will 
then show that both Shecaira and Waller’s deductivism and 
Govier and Guarini’s non-deductivism regarding conclusive 
analogical arguments share a formalist conception of deductive 
validity – which is the reason why Govier and Guarini do not 
regard conclusively valid analogical arguments as deductively 
valid, and also the reason why Waller and Shecaira do (section 
4). I will criticise this view by explaining the problems of 
evaluating natural language argumentation by using argument 
schemas which have not been properly backed by a theory of 
interpretation (sections 4 and 5). I will also criticise the 
particular problems of Shecaira’s proposal, and explain why the 
model proposed in Bermejo-Luque (2012) was a way to avoid 
these problems and the problems associated with deductivism, 
in general (sections 5 and 6). 
 
 
2. Quantitative analogies and qualitative analogies 
 
As a basis for our discussion, it seems appropriate to start from 
an overall characterization of analogies themselves. Analogies 
are powerful cognitive tools: in thinking of unfamiliar objects as 
similar to familiar ones, we enable working hypotheses for 
dealing with novelties, paths to become familiar with new things 
and phenomena.1 But what does it mean to say that two things 
are “similar”? Similarity is a concept that is difficult to define 
non-circularly. For example, dictionaries bring you from 
                                                
1 On this view, analogies are not particularly argumentative. For example, as 
Waller (2001: 200) pointed out, they may have a merely figurative use. (For a 
survey of uses of analogies, see Bermejo-Luque, forthcoming-a) 
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“similarity” to “alikeness”, “comparability” or “resemblance”, 
and from these, to “similarity” again. I myself will not try a 
definition as such, but I will make a few distinctions. 
Current literature on analogies – and specifically, on 
analogical argumentation and reasoning – seems to be torn 
between two conceptions of similarity. On the one hand, there is 
a quantitative view, according to which two things, facts, 
situations, etc. are similar when they have enough relevant 
properties in common. For example, you are about to buy a new 
car, and you observe that the one you are considering is like 
another one that you have already refused. It is about the same 
size, both engines are basically the same; the quality of the 
finish is on a par, similar shape, and so forth. In these 
conditions, we deem the analogical judgment to be very sound: 
quantitative analogies are better or worse depending on the 
amount of “relevant properties in common” – whatever that 
means, as we are going to see. 
Of course, you probably don’t care about things like the 
similarities between their plate numbers or the first names of the 
owners of the companies that manufacture each car. 
Remarkably, because anything has an indefinite number of 
properties, in principle, the amount of properties that any two 
things have in common is as indefinitely big as the amount of 
properties that they don’t. This is why we must always judge 
analogies by taking into account the context and purposes for 
which they have been put forward. Regarding quantitative 
analogies, such context and purposes implicitly determine the 
set of properties that counts for making the comparison, as well 
as the amount of properties in common that is enough for 
making the corresponding analogy sound. Whether or not two 
things have enough relevant properties in common is a 
contextual matter in this double sense; yet, it is also critical 
because not finding enough relevant properties in common 
would render the analogy (more or less) unsound. At any rate, in 
this quantitative sense, whether or not an analogy is sound is an 
empirical, or better, an a posteriori matter – that is, something to 
be discovered and checked by further inspecting both analogs. 
Consequently, for a quantitative analogy to be appraisable – 
and, therefore, meaningful – independent information about the 
corresponding characteristics of both analogs must be available.2  
                                                
2 For example, a quantitative analogy like “the organs of complex creatures 
living on planets with high atmospheric pressure would be like those of the 
animal fauna living in the deep ocean environment” makes sense as a 
quantitative analogy because we can figure out the characteristics of the 
organs of complex creatures living in a planet with high atmospheric 
pressure, despite the fact they do not exist, as far as we know. 
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As I argue in Bermejo-Luque (forthcoming – b), this 
quantitative conception of similarity is particularly at stake in 
law courts, when one of the parties’ strategy is to show that the 
case under consideration is analogous to another one already 
judged. 
However, we frequently establish similarities that do not 
fit this quantitative conception. On the one hand, we say things 
like “these colours are alike”, “our kids are about the same size”, 
“their voices are very similar”, etc. Being similar in this sense is 
not a matter of a set of relevant properties in common, but rather 
of reference to a particular quality and the idea of proximity of 
the things compared to something like a point on a scale of this 
quality (i.e., a colour spectrum, human size, sets of harmonics, 
etc.). This conception of similarity is qualitative in the following 
sense: it is not the amount of properties in common that makes 
the similarity claim more or less sound, but the proximity 
between the properties at stake within a given scale. Of course, 
which properties are at stake is a contextual matter, as it is the 
idea of “proximity” in each case. For example, because we are 
talking about kids, and not about microorganisms, a difference 
in microns happens to be irrelevant. And when the properties at 
stake are not close enough to each other on the relevant scale 
and in the relevant amount, the similarity claim can be 
dismissed. 
Certainly, this is another way of establishing similarities; 
yet, I think we should regard claims stating this kind of 
similarity as comparisons, rather than as analogies proper. The 
need to distinguish analogies from comparisons comes from the 
fact that there seems to be something peculiar in saying that 
claims such as “our kids are about the same size” are analogies, 
despite being similarity statements indeed. 
On the other hand, we also establish similarities between 
things, facts, situations, etc. when they share something very 
significant and remarkable within the context and for the 
purposes of the conversation. Such analogies – e.g., “a life 
without friends is like a garden without flowers”, “character is 
like a tree and reputation is like a shadow”, “love is like a 
butterfly”, “love is like a rock”, “love is like a bottle of gin” – 
also pivot on a qualitative conception of similarity in the sense 
that it is not the amount of relevant properties in common which 
makes the comparison more or less sound, but rather it is how 
significant and striking the property that both analogs have in 
common is. 
Noticeably, in formulating this type of analogy, we 
somehow predetermine the way in which it makes sense to 
compare the two analogs. We do not state this kind of similarity 
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as an empirical matter – i.e., as something to be discovered by 
empirically inspecting the properties of both things, as in the 
case of quantitative analogies – but as an a priori one. That is, 
we conceive it as a matter of both analogs being members of a 
category that is settled, a “new” category for which the very 
analogy stands. This category may be difficult or just impossible 
to specify in so many words without losing part of the analogy’s 
insight. This is why qualitative analogies are characteristically 
vague and inexplicit, and closer to metaphors than quantitative 
ones. However, qualitative analogies may also be dismissed or 
resisted by pointing out that there is some very relevant feature 
which does not really apply or should not be applied to one of 
the analogs. This feature would be something that would be 
distinctive of the category if the analogy really made sense. For 
example: “I think of love rather as a path than as a butterfly; it’s 
not something to contemplate, but something to be actively 
involved in.” 
Finally, it is also important to distinguish similarity 
statements (analogies and comparisons) from sameness 
statements because, apart from statements of co-referentiality, 
sameness statements can also be statements of an attributive 
relationship between two different things. For example, my 
piece of lemon pie is not the same as your piece of lemon pie; 
but if I say that you and I have chosen the same dessert, you will 
not understand that statement to mean that I have chosen your 
particular piece of lemon pie. There is a sense in which 
“sameness” is a matter of inclusion in a specific category. In this 
sense, my dessert and your dessert are “the same” as far as they 
both can be described as “a piece of lemon pie.” Which category 
is the relevant one is something implicit in the context of the 
conversation. In one context, my piece of Gino’s lemon pie is 
not the same as your piece homemade lemon pie; in other 
contexts, they can be said to be the same, e.g., pieces of lemon 
pie, lemon desserts, pieces of a pie, etc. 
Because we have characterized qualitative analogical 
statements as statements that pivot on the soundness of making a 
category out of the two analogs, it may seem that they are a type 
of sameness statements. But there is a key difference between 
them: qualitative analogical statements do not appeal to already 
available categories. Rather, they create the relevant categories 
in themselves; the category is constituted by the very 
comparison and this is its entire specification. In this sense, 
sameness statements work as classifications whereas qualitative 
analogies have a more prospective character. 
In dealing with their argumentative uses, we will have to 
be very clear about whether we are considering a sameness 
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statement or an analogy, because their corresponding criteria of 
correctness are very different from each other. As pointed out, 
two different things are “the same” – always, in some respect– if 
they both may be described, within the context, as members of a 
certain category, and this is an all-or-nothing property. In turn, 
quantitative analogies are analogies whose (more or less) 
soundness is a matter of the number of relevant properties that 
are shared by both analogs, and qualitative analogies are 
analogies whose (more or less) soundness depends on the 
significance and relevance of the comparison between the 
analogs, and the adequacy of establishing a category consisting 
of the two analogs. As argued in Bermejo-Luque (forthcoming – 
b), the distinction between quantitative analogical statements 
and sameness statements is crucial for distinguishing juridical 
argumentation from precedent (which is deemed to be 
conclusive) from juridical analogical argumentation (which is 
deemed to be non-conclusive).  
 
 
3. Inductive and non-inductive 
 
So much for the distinction between comparisons, analogies 
(quantitative and qualitative) and sameness statements. Now, 
this distinction between quantitative and qualitative analogies 
will bring to memory Trudy Govier’s distinction between 
inductive analogies and a priori analogies. However, Govier’s 
distinction is not on analogies, but on analogical arguments: 
 
Following Wisdom and Barker, I use the term "inductive analogy" 
for those arguments by analogy in which the analogue used is a real 
(that is, non-hypothetical) instance, and the features it is said to have 
are attributed to it on the basis of observation or other empirical 
means. (Govier, 1989: 141). 
 
Basically, quantitative analogies (our terminology) would 
correspond to the “reasons” in the sort of analogical arguments 
that Govier calls “inductive analogies.” However, as we have 
seen, our distinction between a posteriori or quantitative 
analogies and a priori or qualitative analogies is not a matter of 
whether one of the analogs is real or invented, which is Govier’s 
criterion for distinguishing inductive analogies from a priori 
ones: 
 
The difference between a priori analogy and inductive analogy, as 
I’m employing the terms here, is that in an a priori analogy, the 
analogue need not be a real case. It can be entirely hypothetical and 
may, in fact, be positively fanciful. (Govier 1989: 142) 
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In our account, quantitative analogies are not necessarily 
empirical, as they may involve one or two non-existent analogs; 
but they are always a posteriori. They pivot on the possibility of 
further inspecting and comparing both analogs – possibly, by 
inferring their (would-be) properties, not necessarily by 
empirically checking them. In turn, qualitative analogies are a 
priori because their criterion of soundness is a matter of the 
adequacy of seeing one of the analogs in terms of the other. If an 
a priori analogy is taken to be sound, i.e., if we agree in seeing 
one of the analogs in terms of the other, then that cognitive 
strategy precedes our approach to the phenomena. It is 
genuinely a priori. As pointed out before, this feature makes a 
priori analogies very close to metaphors.3 
However, it is not only qualitative analogical statements 
that are far from ordinary descriptions. Both quantitative and 
qualitative analogical statements involve, as a condition of 
meaningfulness, an intrinsic appeal to that which is relevant to 
the case. Certainly, any communicative move involves a certain 
appeal to relevance in order to make sense as such; but for 
analogies this appeal is a necessary condition for having content 
at all, precisely because any two things are both similar and 
dissimilar in indefinitely many ways. This intrinsic appeal to 
relevance – i.e., the relevance of the features that matter (in the 
case of quantitative analogies), or the relevance of the feature 
that is the ground for making a category out of both analogs (in 
the case of qualitative analogies) – is the reason why bare 
analogical claims – i.e., claims of the form “A is like B” – do 
                                                
3 In the article of mine that Shecaira criticizes, I argue further for this view, 
pointing out that the idea that (qualitative) analogies are like metaphors in not 
having a propositional content as such is the mainstream position in the 
philosophy of language, and that this is the reason why analogical 
argumentation is particularly powerful as a rhetorical device. But Shecaira 
does not get into this point, insisting on treating all types of analogical 
statements as mere descriptive claims that may be readily generalized by 
making explicit that which makes the two things compared “similar”. 
Contrastingly, in my view, the way in which qualitative analogies work as 
proposals for “seeing as” would be the key to understand their widespread 
use in moral reasoning. Actually, our account would explain why moral 
particularists can find in analogical reasoning a preeminent way of making 
conclusive moral arguments. But Shecaira’s strategy is rather to dismiss 
particularism altogether. 
At any rate, the fact that analogies do not have a semantic content of their 
own would be the reason why, when used as reasons, we have to reconstruct 
their propositional content, so as to have something on which we can agree or 
disagree. In Bermejo-Luque (2012) I claimed that analogical argumentation 
is a type of non-literal argumentation, and I provided a proposal for 
reconstructing qualitative analogies when used as reasons.  
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not work as ordinary, literal descriptions. In other words, there 
is no real property in the world for which “similarity” stands. 
“Similar” is not a real predicate, it does not have a semantic 
content of its own; rather, it is a suggestion to consider things in 
a certain way. Consequently, analogical claims, instead of being 
properly true or false statements, behave as more or less sound 
cognitive proposals.  
It might be argued that it is possible to turn bare 
analogical claims of the form “A is like B” into real descriptions 
by specifying in which sense or senses A is like B. That would 
be making ampliative analogical claims of the form “A is like B 
in sharing features a, b, c.” However, there are two reasons why 
this suggestion cannot really work. On the one hand, there is the 
problem of determining what “sharing a feature” is. Is it a matter 
of having “the same” feature in the above sense (so that, again, a 
reference to the relevant category for making the classification is 
necessary) or is it a matter of having a “similar” feature (so that 
we are back to the problem of determining their similarity)? On 
the other hand, the role of such specifications cannot be that of 
describing the similarity between A and B because, for any A 
and B, there are indefinitely many ways in which they can be 
said to be similar just as there are many other ways in which 
they can be said to be different. Rather, such specifications 
behave as reasons for showing the plausibility of the bare 
analogical claim. After all, in order to reject an ampliative 
analogical claim, we do not necessarily have to refuse that A 
and B “share” properties a, b, c; we can also reject that sharing 
these properties makes A and B similar – that is, similar in the 
relevant sense. In other words, we can reject an argument for the 
similarity between A and B either by refusing the reason –
namely, that A and B share properties a, b, c – or by refusing the 
warrant – namely, that this is a good reason for saying that they 
are alike. 
Now, the other reason for not adopting Govier’s 
distinction between inductive and a priori analogies is that it 
seems ill-founded. In contrast with “deductive” and “inductive,” 
“a priori” and “a posteriori” are not types of inferences4 but 
types of judgments, and it is somewhat misleading to identify 
the a priori or a posteriori nature of the analogical claim with its 
foreseeable use as a reason or backing for an inductive or a 
                                                
4 Or types of validity, as suggested by Hitchcock (1980) or types of standards 
for evaluating arguments, as suggested by Govier (1980). As I explain below, 
in our model it is safe and coherent to think of deductiveness and 
inductiveness as types of inferences, for this model does not conflate the 
concepts of validity and deductiveness. 
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deductive argument, respectively. For, in principle, both 
quantitative (or a posteriori) analogies and qualitative (or a 
priori) analogies can be used as reasons for both deductive and 
inductive arguments. It depends, among other things, on which 
other reasons constitute these arguments and the analogies for 
which they are a reason.5 
On our account, analogical argumentation is, basically, 
argumentation in which an analogy is adduced in order to 
support a further claim. What we have in these cases is, 
paradigmatically, arguments of the form “A is like B, therefore 
A is Z”. In this type of argument, the analogy happens to be 
what Toulmin calls the data in his model, i.e., the evidence that 
is pointed out in support of a conclusion. For example, in “the 
political situation is like in the past elections; the party in office 
will probably win again”, a quantitative analogy is used as a 
reason, whereas in “the news has dropped on the Peace 
Conference like a bomb; there will probably be retaliatory 
actions”, it is a qualitative analogy which does the work.6 
However, as pointed out in Bermejo-Luque (2012), 
arguments of the form “B is Z, therefore A is Z” may also be 
analogical in some cases, namely, when the inference is drawn 
in virtue of an alleged similarity between A and B. In these 
cases, the analogy would correspond to the backing in 
Toulmin’s model, i.e., the fact that stands behind the warrant of 
the argument and justifies the step from reason to conclusion. In 
these cases, the context can make it clear that there is an analogy 
adduced as a reason for the warrant “if B is Z, then A is Z”. “— 
                                                
5 James Freeman (2013) has also entered into the discussion about the 
definition of a priori analogies. He agrees with Govier that the distinction 
between a priori analogies and inductive analogies regards arguments, not 
judgments, but disagrees with her definition of a priori analogies as 
analogies based on the possibly hypothetical status of the analogs. In 
Freeman’s view, “the hallmark [of a priori analogies] concerns the epistemic 
status of the warrant, not whether we may reflectively compare analogue and 
primary subject for similarities argued from.” (Freeman 2013: 178-179). 
Actually, in his account, there is another hallmark of a priori analogies, 
which is that they are about moral issues. According to Freeman (2013:180), 
the epistemic status of the warrant is a priori because it is based on moral 
intuitions, which, following Ross’ form of intuitionism, he takes to be a 
priori but synthetic (giving rise to the possibility of admitting the 
defeasibility of the corresponding arguments). However, I see no reason for 
restricting the use of the term “a priori” for analogies grounding moral 
arguments. The analogy in “don’t cheat the taxman, it’s like stealing from 
society” does not seem more a priori than the analogy in “don’t mix the salad 
dressing like that, it’s like dancing single legged”, which is not particularly 
moral. 
6 Noticeably, this is an example of a non-deductive argument having as its 
reason an a priori analogy. 
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Why?” “— Because A is like B”. For example, in saying 
something like “That strategy didn’t work last time; so, it won’t 
work now”, we are reasoning analogically. That is, we conclude 
that a given strategy won’t work from the fact that it didn’t work 
earlier because we take both situations to be (quantitatively) 
alike. In turn, in “don’t ask Jane to pay her bill; you wouldn’t 
ask such a thing of a goddess”, it is the (qualitative) comparison 
of Jane with a goddess which justifies the inference from “you 
wouldn’t ask a goddess such a thing” to “don’t ask Jane to pay 
her bill”. 
In sum, within the argumentative uses of analogies, we 
must distinguish between using analogies as data or premises, 
and using analogies as backings or reasons for the inference-
claim. And both quantitative and qualitative analogies can be 
used as data or backings for both deductive and non-deductive 
arguments. 
In what follows, I will only focus on conclusive 
analogical arguments having a priori (qualitative) analogies as 
their reasons, because these are the type of arguments Govier, 
Guarini, Waller and Shecaira have discussed. Contrary to them, 
I will argue that some of these arguments can be deductively 
valid without involving further premises. However, this will 
amount to a defence of Govier’s account of a priori analogies – 
or, at least, of her view that analogical arguments can be 




4. The debate 
 
Remarkably, Govier, Guarini, Waller and Shecaira agree on the 
idea that inductive analogical arguments are structurally 
different from non-inductive ones.7 They also agree on naming 
non-inductive analogical arguments a priori. As already pointed 
out, this would be a category mistake; “a priori” should be used 
for naming types of analogical claims, not types of arguments. 
Yet, for the sake of following their naming and line of 
reasoning, I am going to assume that it makes sense to establish 
a category called ‘a priori analogical arguments’ which consists 
of non-inductive analogical arguments having qualitative 
analogies as reasons. In principle, non-inductive arguments 
                                                
7 This is something I have criticised in Bermejo-Luque (2012: 3-4) as a 
merely ad hoc claim having to do with their corresponding assumptions on 
argument analysis as a matter of adopting one or another argument schema. I 
go back to this discussion in sections 5 and 6. 
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might have been regarded, simply, as deductive arguments – 
that is, as arguments whose conclusions are meant to follow by 
necessity and whose validity is a matter of whether or not this is 
actually so.8 However, neither Govier and Guarini, on the one 
hand, nor Waller and Shecaira, on the other, were willing to call 
their target objects “deductive analogical arguments.” For they 
all seem to assume that, if these arguments are deductive, it is 
because they are formally valid (i.e. they include certain 
universal premises turning them into valid syllogisms or 
instances of modus ponens) and their point of discrepancy is on 
whether a priori analogical arguments involve universal claims 
among their premises and, thus, whether or not they are 
deductive (in that sense). Because Govier and Guarini think that 
a priori analogical arguments do not involve universal claims as 
premises, they refuse to name them “deductive.” In turn, 
because Waller and Shecaira wish to defend the position that 
such arguments involve universal claims as premises, they 
cannot prejudice the issue by naming these arguments 
“deductive.” 
Certainly, since Trudy Govier has championed the 
informal logic approach to argument evaluation, such 
identification of deductiveness with formal validity seems 
strange indeed. But the reason for this incidental identification is 
that, in distinguishing between deductive, inductive and 
analogical arguments, Govier, and the discussants following her, 
were adopting the Aristotelian distinction between arguments 
from the general to the particular, from the particular to the 
general, and from particular to particular, respectively. Thus, 
Waller and Shecaira would be rejecting the view that a priori 
analogical arguments are arguments from particular to particular 
after all; or better, they would be holding that if such arguments 
were arguments from particular to particular, they could never 
be good. 
However, this Aristotelian distinction is old-fashioned 
for good reasons. Notably, it is too influenced by the syllogistic, 
according to which, from two particular premises, no conclusion 
                                                
8 The idea that some properties of arguments depend on the possibility of 
presenting arguments as being thus and so is consubstantial to the very 
concept of argument. Indeed, we all are familiar with the standard definition 
of arguments as “any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow 
from the others, which are regarded as providing support or grounds for the 
truth of that one” (Copi and Cohen (2002: 6), my italics). In my view, this is 
so because arguments are, first of all, speech-acts –that is, propositional 
contents put forward as being thus and so and having such and such 
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follows of necessity. This is why it happens to be misleading out 
of this realm. What should we say of arguments like “so it’s 
false that she didn’t come; therefore, she came indeed” or “John 
is either at home or working, and he is not at home; so, he is 
working”? Are they deductive, or arguments from particular to 
particular, or both? Saying that they are deductive in this 
Aristotelian sense by merely positing some implicit general 
claim seems quite ad hoc, and saying that they are conclusively 
valid but not deductively valid raises the problem of explaining 
what this means.9 
According to Govier, a priori analogical arguments are 
conclusive;10 but, she says that they cannot be taken to be 
deductive because, in general, we cannot take universal claims 
be part of them. At least, she argues, such universal claims 
should not be taken to be implicit premises; for, otherwise, our 
interpretation of a priori analogical arguments would make 
mere syllogisms of them, rendering the analogies themselves 
redundant and leaving out of our analyses all which is 
characteristic of this way of arguing. In her account, a priori 
analogical arguments amount to a special type of inference 
precisely because they can be conclusively valid in absence of 
                                                
9 This is, after all, Govier’s main debt: to explain what is being conclusively 
valid if not being deductively valid. 
10 Consider this remark by Govier: 
  
If argument A is invalid and argument B is "just like" it, then B is 
invalid too. The point would seem to be established entirely 
conclusively. But of course no two argument or cases are ever just 
alike. What is meant, in effect, is 'alike in all relevant respects'. And 
whether two cases are alike in all relevant respects is something that 
is always open to further discussion. (Govier, 1989: 143) 
 
Because whether or not “all relevant respects” have been taken into account 
depends on whether or not arguments A and B can be said to be alike in the 
relevant sense (a sense that determines the meaning of “just like” after all), 
this argument is certainly conclusively (deductively) valid: its conclusion 
cannot be false if its premises are true. Yet, because the arguer does not 
predetermine the way in which A is like B, it might be the case that her 
addressee is willing to take for granted the premise (by adopting a different 
sense of “just like” – for example, as “they both are really difficult to 
follow,” “they are the same rubbish,” “they are written with a similar 
typography,” etc) and still resist the conclusion. As argued before, the 
meaning of analogical claims is characteristically vague, and this is why they 
leave open the possibility of taking them to be true and yet taking them to 
imply (even necessarily imply) contradictory conclusions. As I see it, with 
this case Govier would be pointing at something Freeman (2013) and myself 
(Bermejo-Luque, 2012) have more explicitly argued for, namely, that 
analogical arguments can be both deductive and defeasible. I go back to this 
question in section 5. 
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universal premises –which, on the other hand, she admits, may 
be “implied by the argument” (Govier, 1989: 148). 
Contrastingly, Waller (2001) contended that a priori 
analogical arguments should be interpreted and analyzed in 
terms of the following schema: 
 
1. We both agree on case a 
2. The most plausible reason for believing a is   
acceptance of principle C 
3. C implies b (b is a case that fits principle C) 
4. Therefore, consistency requires accepting b 
 
This schema would not make the analogy redundant, as we 
would need it in order to ascertain the universal claim that is 
part of the argument, according to Waller. Yet, it would render a 
priori analogical arguments deductive.11 
In response to Waller’s article, Govier (2002) pointed at 
what I take to be the key issue in this discussion, namely, the 
role of the relationship between argument analysis (i.e., the 
activity of portraying the structure of arguments as logical 
devices) and argument interpretation (i.e., the activity of 
ascertaining the meaning of arguments as pieces of 
communication). In Bermejo-Luque (2012), I pointed out that 
unless our models for argument analysis are based on our 
models for argument interpretation, the question of whether or 
not a certain type of arguments has this or that structure will 
only get petitio principii answers: 
 
-­‐ “These arguments are/aren’t deductive because 
we have to analyze (and eventually reconstruct) 
them according to this/that logical schema” 
-­‐ “Why should we?” 
-­‐ “Because they have this/that logical structure” 
-­‐ “How do you know?” 
-­‐ “Because they have to be analyzed (and 
eventually reconstructed) according to this/that 
logical schema” 
 
If the task of portraying the logical structure of a certain 
type of argument is a matter of following our intuitions about 
what is structurally going on in such arguments, then we will 
have nothing, apart from our confronted intuitions, to appeal to 
in order to grant our claims that these arguments have/haven’t a 
                                                
11 See Guarini (2004: 164, footnote 2) for an explanation of why this 
argument schema can be taken to be deductive after all. 
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deductive structure. Contrastingly, if our model for argument 
analysis is based on a model of argument interpretation, our 
claims on the alleged structure of such arguments will be 
supported by an independent theory – a theory that, on the other 
hand, is the first instrument we must use when dealing with 
natural language argumentation, as it is needed in order to get 
the meaning of argumentative speech-acts as actual pieces of 
communication. 
Govier is sensitive to the problems of reconstructing 
arguments in order to make them fit our schemas. But her 
strategy is just to insist that (many) a priori analogical real 
arguments do not make any explicit reference to principles or 
general claims that could turn them into deductively (formally) 
valid arguments.12 
On the other hand, as Govier pointed out, the fact that in 
arguing by analogy we do not have to appeal to general 
principles explains, at least in part, the characteristic charm and 
rhetorical power of using analogies for drawing conclusions. 
Often, we use analogies when we do not have a principle at 
hand or do not want to commit ourselves to one such principle 
in so many words. Consequently, according to Govier, if we 
impose an argument schema for analyzing the type of argument 
that requires the inclusion of general principles, we will 
probably be unfaithful to the speaker’s words–or think good a 
priori arguments not fitting such schema to be bad ones. In other 
cases, interpreting these arguments as deductively valid will 
make them less cogent (not only less persuasive) than what they 
really are. Besides, at times, such unfaithfulness will amount to 
imposing reconstructions that will turn the dialectic into a straw 
man fallacy. In Govier’s words, Waller’s case “is flawed due to 
his failure to distinguish between an argument per se, as 
articulated by its author, and a philosophical reconstruction of 
that argument” (Govier, 2002: 155). In her view, principles or 
universal claims are not implicit premises in (most) analogical 
real arguments, and we should not force our analyses of 
analogical real arguments in order to make them fit our 
schemas, but rather look for schemas that properly deal with 
their special characteristics. 
According to Govier, then, the evaluation of analogical 
argumentation would depend on the ARG (acceptability, 
                                                
12 Certainly, such strategy does not work for convincing those, like Shecaira, 
who have opposite intuitions. This is why an important part of my argument 
in the paper that Shecaira criticises was to point at the need of linking our 
theories of argument analysis to our theories of argument interpretation. 
However, Shecaira’s paper does not address this question in his defence of 
deductivism. 
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relevance and good ground) criteria that characterize her 
approach to argumentation appraisal in general: 
 
The analogy will be a good one insofar as the analogue and the 
primary case share all the features which are logically relevant to the 
conclusion. Whether this is the case is something we can determine 
a priori, from reflective examination of the cases (Govier 2013, p. 
328) 
 
But Shecaira (2013) finds this model wanting. In his view, the 
point of Waller’s endeavour was to avoid what he takes to be a 
consequence of Govier’s approach: namely, that “a debate 
prompted by an analogical argument will amount to no more 
than a battle of intuitions” (Shecaira, 2013: 422).  This is why he 
provides a defence of Waller’s model against Govier’s, 
Guarini’s and my own criticisms. This defence involves a 
reinterpretation of Waller’s proposal. For, in his view, “Waller’s 
schema does not represent analogical arguments simply as 
deductive inferences, but rather as complexes of two inferences 
only one of which is deductive” (Shecaira, 2013: 407). In 
addition, Shecaira suggests that Waller’s formulation involves 
some rhetorical features that are dispensable. Thus, according to 
him, Waller’s schema should be outlined in the following way: 
 
 Premise: A 
 Inductive (partial) conclusion: Plausibly, Principle C 
 Premise: if C, then B 
 Deductive (final) conclusion: B13 
 
Against Govier’s criticism that most everyday analogical 
argumentation does not involve principles as explicit premises, 
Shecaira’s main point is to insist that his schema – just as any 
other argumentative schema, to be fair – is meant to fulfil a 
double function: firstly, to provide a starting point for analyzing 
the corresponding arguments, and secondly, to provide a basis 
for evaluating them. Insisting on this latter function, Shecaira 
points out that his defence of Waller’s account involves “a 
normative claim to the effect that analogical arguments that do 
not fit Waller’s schema are defective or sub-optimal instances of 
their kind.” (Shecaira, 2013: 407-408). Thus, according to 
Shecaira, (his amendment of) Waller’s schema: 
                                                
13 Actually, Shecaira’s model corresponds pretty exactly with what Aristotle 
called an argument from example (paradeigma), as described in the Rhetoric 
(Rhetoric 1402b15) and the Prior Analytics (Pr. An. 69a1-15ff), but not to an 








(…) is not meant just as an accurate representation of analogical 
arguments crafted by professionals; it is also a model informed by 
normative assumptions about what makes an analogical argument a 
good argument (or at least a better argument than other possible 
instances of its kind). (Shecaira, 2013: 423) 
 
 
5. Problems with Shecaira’s account 
 
According to Shecaira, his amendment of Waller’s schema “is 
an accurate representation, not of analogical arguments 
generally, but of analogical arguments as they are 
characteristically formulated by professional moral philosophers 
and judges” (2013: 430). This is an empirical claim that he 
supports with some evidence from law court argumentation – 
which, in my view, is not compelling and, at times, is frankly 
misleading, (see Bermejo-Luque (forthcoming – b) for details). 
Yet, together with this empirical claim, there is the normative 
claim that a priori arguments not fitting the Waller-Shecaira 
schema are defective in some sense. But what does this latter 
claim mean? Even if it were true that professional moral 
philosophers and judges use only a priori arguments fitting this 
schema, this is not enough to conclude that arguments that do 
not fit it are wrong. At best, that fact could be a symptom of 
their falling short of being right, but we would still need a 
proper explanation of why they are defective. 
Apart from “defective,” Shecaira calls these arguments 
not only ‘unprofessional’ but also ‘sub-optimal’. So, what does 
it mean for an argument to be sub-optimal in Shecaira’s sense? 
Is sub-optimality a type of rhetorical flaw? Well, not really. In 
principle, a priori arguments not fitting Waller-Shecaira’s 
schema are frequently successful at persuading their addressees, 
and they can be deemed optimal in that they are both persuasive 
enough and short enough for slogans, quick advices, 
introductions or summaries, for example. For advertisers, 
politicians – or even lawyers, at least, at times – this is the most 
professional and optimal an argument can be. 
Is, then, “sub-optimal” a type of dialectical flaw like that 
of making a straw man, insufficiently responding to criticisms, 
or illegitimately shifting the burden of proof? As I’ve pointed 
out, Shecaira’s main complaint regarding a priori analogical 
arguments not fitting his amendment of Waller’s schema is that, 
in his view, a debate prompted by any of them “will amount to 
no more than a battle of intuitions.” But, as I see it, there must 
be something wrong in this line of reasoning. After all, debates 
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always provide a good field for battles of intuitions. For, any of 
the reasons that we offer in support of our claims can be further 
argued for, but this process must eventually come to an end; if 
the outcome is agreement, such end is the point in which arguer 
and addressee share intuitions, and if the outcome is 
disagreement, the end is the point in which arguer’s and 
addressee’s intuitions just clash. Regarding analogical 
argumentation, agreement of intuitions may happen as soon as a 
bare analogy is put forward or as late as numerous subsequent 
reasons have been adduced in its support or in support of the 
view that such analogy supports the conclusion (that is, in 
support of the warrant of the argument, following Toulmin’s 
model). Certainly, moral principles may do the trick for the 
latter; sometimes, they can provide a rationale for showing our 
inferences from certain analogies to certain moral claims to be 
right. However, in order to avoid a battle of intuitions, both 
reasons for the analogy and reasons for the warrant (including 
principles) will require either further reasons or a later 
agreement of intuitions. Consequently, it seems excessively 
demanding on a priori analogical arguments to state that they 
can only be good as long as they do not provide fields for battles 
of intuitions; no argument would be good on such strict 
dialectical standard. 
We are then left with the idea that, by “sub-optimal,” 
Shecaira is naming a logical defect. In his account, a priori 
arguments not fitting his amendment of Waller’s schema would 
be logically flawed. However, the plausibility of this claim 
depends on the conception of logical goodness that we endorse. 
And at this point, we can see that Waller and Shecaira’s defense 
of a deductivist account of conclusive analogical arguments 
against Govier’s proposal should have been backed by a proper 
defense of formal logic as the right standard for logical 
goodness. For, in their view, we have seen, a priori analogical 
arguments can only be conclusively valid if they are formally 
valid.14 
For her part, Govier just agrees that for these arguments 
to be deductively valid, they must be formally valid. However, 
she contends that they can be conclusively valid without being 
deductively valid – that is, “formally” valid in her approach, 
which is in line with her informal conception of logical validity. 
In turn, as I tried to show in Bermejo-Luque (2012), if we adopt 
a substantial conception of logic like the one Stephen Toulmin 
                                                
14 Actually, Shecaira’s point is that the part of a priori analogical arguments 
that is deductively valid is formally valid (i.e., the part corresponding to the 
second sub-argument in his amendment of Waller’s schema) 
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developed in The Uses of Argument (1958), we can deem some 
conclusive analogical arguments to be deductively valid without 
conceding that they involve universal premises that make them 
formally valid. Actually, my proposal was meant to be more 
than that, as it was based on a normative model for 
argumentation that links a model of argument analysis to a 
theory of argument interpretation. This model is the pragmatic-
linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin’s model developed in 
Bermejo-Luque (2011), which characterizes argumentation as a 
second order speech-act complex by means of Bach & Harnish’s 
Speech Act Schema (Bach & Harnish, 1979).15 
But why should we prefer such substantial conception of 
logical goodness and the corresponding model of argument 
analysis based on a theory of argument interpretation? In my 
view, there are practical reasons having to do with the problems 
of reconstructing natural language arguments in order to make 
them fit (either formal or non-formal) argument schemas, and 
more theoretical reasons having to do with the very project of 
dealing with logical goodness independently from a theory of 
argument interpretation. The peculiarities of conclusive 
analogical arguments make these reasons particularly striking. 
Let me start by the former kind of reasons. As we have 
seen, Shecaira does not deny that there are a priori analogical 
arguments that do not fit his amendment of Waller’s schema. 
Rather, his point is to insist that, unless we can find a universal 
principle – i.e., the conclusion of an allegedly implicit inductive 
sub-argument – for them to fit it, such arguments will be 
defective. But, where is the gain in condemning these 
arguments? In principle, bare analogical arguments – i.e., 
arguments of the form “A is like B; so, you’d better not do it,” 
“A is like B; so, there is nothing wrong with it,” “A is like B; so, 
it’s up to you,” etc – are quite frequent. And this must be so 
                                                
15 As explained in more detail in Bermejo-Luque (2011, Chs. 3 and 4) and 
(2012), this characterization of acts of arguing as second order speech-acts by 
means of Bach & Harnish’s SAS enables us to deal with both indirect and 
non-literal argumentation (like analogical argumentation). In this model, any 
act of arguing would have the following structure: 
 
 (omr)Premise _________therefore___ (emx)(omt) Conclusion 
| 
since 
(omi)Warrant: “if R, then C” 
 
And argumentative discourse will be a series of acts of argumenting, more or 
less related to each other according to this schema (See for example 
Bermejo-Luque (2012) for a brief explanation of this model and the theory of 
evaluation that results from it) 
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precisely because they seem perfectly fine to many people; 
otherwise, they would be a bad option, even from a merely 
rhetorical point of view. Should we then say that these people 
(including me) are stupid or unreasonable? Well, it seems 
appropriate to refrain from the temptation of declaring a good 
deal of people unreasonable – at least, whenever we have an 
option not to do so. 
Shecaira might respond that we take at least some of 
these arguments to be good because we take them to implicitly 
involve the corresponding principles. However, as Govier 
pointed out, when an arguer does not explicitly commit herself 
to one of such principles, supplying one of our own may involve 
an uncharitable account of her actual views. Consider, for 
example, this short version of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous 
argument on abortion (Jarvis Thomson, 1971): “Becoming 
pregnant as a result of rape is like becoming physically 
connected by force to someone who would certainly die if 
disconnected. Therefore, there is no obligation to carry on a 
pregnancy resulting from rape.” Many different principles could 
be used in order to make this argument fit Waller-Shecaira’s 
schema. Among them, these three: 
 
(1) “There is no obligation to stay linked to a 
human being, even if that person will die 
otherwise, if we have been forced into that 
situation” 
(2)  “There is no obligation to save another human 
being’s life for whose situation we are not 
responsible” 
(3) “We have a right to free ourselves from 
whatever we have been forced to” 
 
Yet, whereas (1) seems quite plausible as a general principle, (2) 
and (3) seem much harder to defend. Do we really have no 
obligation to save a drowning stranger, for example? Can you 
leave your little sister alone at the fair just because your mom 
obliged you to take her there? As Govier might argue, taking 
Jarvis Thomson to be arguing in consonance with (2) or (3) 
would be quite unfaithful to her point of view and would make 
her position much less cogent than what it actually is. In fact, 
even principle (1) may be taken to misrepresent the point of this 
argument. After all, the analogy pivots on only two particular 
cases and what they are supposed to have in common, whereas 
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principle (1) is supposed to subsume additional cases, some of 
which might happen to be less evident.16 
Certainly, principles can provide something Shecaira 
seems to demand from analogical arguments, namely, a 
rationale, an overall justification for our inferring the conclusion 
from the analogy. But this is not the only way to provide such 
justification,17 and principles do so at the cost of turning the 
arguer’s claims stronger than what they originally were. 
Besides, general principles may be rather unnecessary if the 
arguer and addressee agree that the two cases are alike in the 
relevant respect, whether or not they take other cases to be 
similar to these as well. At any rate, as argued above, pointing 
out a rationale may be dialectically required at times, but it 
cannot be a condition of argument goodness; for, such condition 
involves a vicious infinite regress, and no argument could really 
meet it. 
However, Shecaira thinks that making analogical 
arguments fit his schema by supplying them with general 
principles does not pose any problem at all:  
 
If two different interpretations are equally compatible with the 
evidence, then the interpreter ought, charitably, to opt for the 
interpretation that represents the argument in the most favourable 
light (Shecaira, 2013: 418). 
 
This is certainly an expeditious solution. However, it 
hides what I take to be Govier’s main point, namely, that the 
Principle of Charity is a principle guiding interpretation, not a 
rule of courtesy recommending making the best of the speaker’s 
argument. Thinking of the principle as a rule of courtesy means 
that it can only be applied once we have interpreted the 
speaker’s words as an argument, which in turn means that it is 
not a necessary requirement for interpretation. Contrastingly, as 
an interpretative principle, the principle is a necessary 
requirement for interpretation. We have to be charitable 
because, otherwise, there is nothing to evaluate, no meaning at 
all. 
                                                
16 For example: what about if you only have to stay linked for one second to 
that person, and the people who forced you into that situation will be 
properly punished anyway (so that there is no risk that this becomes a 
legitimate way of saving lives), or if by staying linked you save not only one 
person but a million people? 
17 For example, we may also proceed by reductio: we justify our warrant 
because its negation is untenable or has untenable consequences. This is why 
moral particularists are not bounded to irrationality or mere clashes of 
intuitions when they argue by analogy. 
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In interpreting arguments, we must appeal to the 
Principle of Charity if, and only if, the arguer’s actual words are 
not enough for making herself to be understood. Thus, prior to 
the application of the principle, there is nothing to appraise, and 
after its application we have both, the speaker’s actual meaning 
and a piece of argumentation that can be appraised. This is why 
an interpretative option such as Govier’s, which limits the 
amount of words that is necessary to attribute to the speaker 
which she did not actually say, is preferable. Such option 
amounts to acknowledging that the speaker’s actual words were 
indeed enough for conveying her communicative intentions – 
that is, the piece of argumentative content that she has put 
forward to be understood and appraised. Why should the 
appraisal of argumentation require anything beyond this kind of 
“charity”? How could we justify any other demand? In opting, 
as Shecaira recommends, for the general principle that seems 
most promising to us, we are reconstructing rather than 
interpreting arguments. Such general principle may make the 
argument under consideration better from our perspective, but it 
can make it worse from someone else’s, including the arguer 
herself who may feel misunderstood. This is so because 
reconstruction involves accessory intake, whereas interpretation 
is about getting to understand the speaker’s meaning. No more, 
no less. 
In order to illustrate this point, let us follow Shecaira’s 
proposal, and think for example of a person holding that we 
have an obligation to save human beings whenever it is at our 
hands. That person will take principles (1), (2) and (3) to be 
false, but may take something like principle 4 to be true: 
 
(4) “There is no obligation to stay linked to an 
organism (not a human being), even if that 
organism would die otherwise, if we have been 
forced into that situation.” 
 
Which principle should she adopt for arriving at an instance of 
Waller-Shecaira’s schema from our version of Jarvis 
Thompson’s argument? If she opts for (1), (2) or (3), she will be 
attributing to the arguer a principle that she takes to be false. 
Yet, she cannot just opt for 4 either, because she will not take it 
to follow from premise 1 of the reconstruction of the original 
argument, according to Waller-Shecaira’s schema. Actually, it is 
difficult to see how she could opt for any fitting principle at all, 
as she cannot take anything to follow from premise 1 in this 




© Lilian Bermejo-Luque. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No.3 (2014), pp. 311-336. 
 
332 
Premise 1: We have no obligation to stay physically 
connected to a person if we have been forced into that 
(even if that person would die otherwise) 
 Inductive (partial) conclusion: Plausibly, C1/C2/Cn 
 Premise: if C1/C2/Cn, then no one should be obliged to 
carry on a pregnancy from rape 
Deductive (final) conclusion: No one should be obliged 
to carry on a pregnancy from rape 
 
Does our interpreter’s inability to find a principle mean that she 
didn’t really understand the argument, that she has no adequate 
interpretation of it? Shecaira doesn’t seem to care too much 
about the answer to this question.18 His point is rather to insist 
that, because his schema is normative, if the interpreter does not 
get a reconstruction that she can take to be good, then she must 
deem bad the original argument. 
Yet, what does this normative claim mean? That is, by 
fitting Waller-Shecaira’s schema, is an argument rendered good 
or just shown to be good? For, if we take arguments to be good 
in themselves, prior to making them fit the schema, then we may 
take the schema to be only a means among others for showing 
their goodness. (Other means could be, for example, Govier’s 
ARG criteria, Guarini’s or my own.) But if we take this type of 
argument not to be good until made to fit the schema, then we 
will be implicitly endorsing the view that it is not these very 
arguments, but the corresponding reconstructions fitting the 
schema, that are good. This is, in sum, the problem of 
transferring the evaluation of natural language arguments to a 
theory of analysis that is not properly backed by a theory of 
argument interpretation.19 
Besides, consider for example what happens if our 
interpreter above takes embryos and foetuses to be human 
beings. In this case, she may be perfectly willing to accept the 
original premise of our argument, namely, the analogy 
“becoming pregnant as a result of rape is like becoming 
physically connected by force to someone who would die 
otherwise,” even though, from this premise, she would rather 
                                                
18 However, at least from a cognitive perspective, this question seems 
relevant: disagreeing is not always a matter of not understanding. 
19 Regarding the use of formal schemas for logical appraisal, the dilemma is 
quite the same: we must either adopt a concept of validity which is not 
essentially formal, or take arguments not to be logically valid until 
formalized. This is why some formal logicians think of formal logic as a tool 
for “discovering” natural language validity, whereas others think of formal 
systems as (partial) definitions of the concept of validity. I have dealt with 
the problems of both conceptions of formal logic in Bermejo-Luque (2008). 
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conclude that we have an obligation to both carry on 
pregnancies from rape and stay connected to anyone who would 
die otherwise. To be fair, in such a case, Shecaira’s instructions 
for reconstructing the original argument prove to be neither an 
answer to the question of how to interpret the arguer’s actual 
words, nor able to explain the interpreter’s agreement with the 
arguer’s original premise. 
Moreover, as I explained in my former paper (Bermejo-
Luque, 2012: 21), the possibility of agreeing on the analogy but 
refusing the conclusion is an important feature of deductive 
analogical arguments. As I explained there, analogical 
arguments can be deductive (in the sense of having conclusions 
meant to follow of necessity) but defeasible at the same time (in 
the sense of being subject to counterexamples).20 However, 
Shecaira criticises my account of this feature and deals with it in 
the following way: 
 
Bermejo-Luque also seems to believe that her account has the 
advantage of being able to explain how an analogical argument can 
be deductive yet defeasible. But I think that Waller’s schema fares 
just as well by reference to this criterion. Take Bermejo-Luque’s 
example cited above: to deny that having sex with children is 
impermissible is to deny the arguer’s preferred way of treating the 
source of the analogy. For our purposes, this is a case of denying the 
truth of 1 in Waller’s schema. Anyone who holds a deductivist 
account of an argument type will accept that the relevant arguments 
can be defeated – in the sense of being proved unsound – if any of 
their premises are shown to be false. It is unclear that deductivists 
need to accept the defeasibility of analogical arguments in any other 
sense in order to accommodate the type of example provided by 
Bermejo-Luque. 
 
Yet, this is a peculiar way of understanding defeasibility, which, 
in principle, is not a matter of the possibility of having false 
                                                
20 This apparently paradoxical claim makes sense in our model because, 
contrary to formal logic, this model avoids conflating the concepts of 
deductiveness and validity. In our model, a deductive defeated argument is an 
invalid one, as its conclusion is meant to follow of necessity while it doesn’t. 
As explained in Bermejo-Luque (2011, Ch. 4), and more succinctly in 
Bermejo-Luque (2012), in our model, arguments are deductive when their 
warrants are propositions that, in case of being true, would be necessary 
truths. For example, because they are a conceptual, a mathematical, a logical 
matter, etc. And deductive arguments are valid in case their warrants are 
necessary truths indeed. In turn, inductive arguments are those whose 
conclusions are meant to follow with less certainty than “necessarily.” For 
example, “(more or less) probably,” “presumably,” “plausibly,” etc. And the 
validity of inductive arguments would be a matter of whether or not this is 
actually so, that is, whether or not the corresponding warrants are more or 
less probable, presumable, plausible, etc. 
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premises, but of the possibility of taking premises to be true and 
not taking the conclusion to follow from them. Actually, the 
latter is what the interpreter in our example would take our 
argument to instantiate, and the type of situation that Shecaira’s 
proposal for argument reconstruction seems unable to properly 
deal with. For Shecaira, our interpreter would just disagree with 
the arguer’s preferred way of treating the source of the analogy, 






At this point, we may ask: “what is the gain of Waller and 
Shecaira’s deductivist proposal?” Deductivism, as defended by 
argumentation theorists such as Leo Groarke (1999) or Dale 
Jacquette (1996, 2009), is the view that in order to determine 
whether an argument is good or bad, we must make it fit a 
deductively valid argument schema. As David Godden (2005) 
has pointed out, deductivism involves both a thesis on the 
interpretation of natural language arguments (interpretative 
deductivism) and a thesis on the standard of argument goodness 
(evaluative deductivism). These two theses are related; for the 
deductivist, we must interpret natural language arguments so as 
to make them fit deductively valid schemas because this is a 
means to show that their conclusions cannot be false if their 
corresponding premises are true. In principle, this is deemed to 
be a sound standard of inferential goodness in that it shows 
conclusions to follow of necessity from premises. 
According to the deductivist approach, if in order to fit at 
least one deductively valid schema we must incorporate false 
premises to the original argument, then the argument as a whole 
must be deemed bad. Remarkably, this strategy of argument 
appraisal is a means to determine whether arguments are overall 
good – that is, not just good in their inferences, but also good in 
their premises. In other words, deductivism is useless as a tool 
for determining mere logical goodness – that is, the goodness of 
the inference independently of the goodness of the premises. 
After all, by making an argument fit the schema of a deductively 
valid argument, we are already making it to be valid.21 
                                                
21Or, maybe, showing it to be valid; this is not clear, as argued before. On the 
other hand, deductivists do not necessarily take formal validity as the 
standard for argument goodness, as authors such as Groarke are willing to 
accept materially valid reconstructions of arguments as means to show their 
validity. 
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 I have already argued against the idea of reconstructing 
natural language arguments in order to make them fit argument 
schemas independently of a model of argument interpretation. 
At the very least, deductivism makes some sense as a tool for 
determining argument goodness as it provides a reason to justify 
deduction as a standard for argument goodness. As I’ve pointed 
out, arguments that fit a deductively valid schema have 
conclusions that follow of necessity from their premises and this 
is a suitable account of logical goodness. Contrastingly, 
according to Shecaira, 
 
One crucial qualification is that the schema represents analogical 
arguments as complexes composed of one deductive inference 
(hence “deductivism”) but also of one non-deductive subargument. 
(Shecaira, 2013: 406 (abstract)) 
 
As he explains, this complicated proposal results from the need 
to avoid the problem that, by adding universal principles, the 
analogies in analogical arguments are rendered redundant. 
However, by doing so, the schema is no longer a means of 
showing that the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are 
true. That is, Shecaira’s deductivist proposal does not even take 
advantage of deductivism’s main insight: its plausibility as a 
standard of logical goodness. Thus, even if we are able to 
reconstruct an analogical argument following Shecaira’s 
instructions, we will not have at our disposal deductivism’s 
rationale for saying that such argument is good. 
As Govier has taught us, the problem with analogical 
arguments is that supplying allegedly underlying principles in 
order to make them fit (partially) deductively valid schemas is 
unwarranted. And it is also dispensable, I have tried to show, as 
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